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March 30, 1951

TO : Assistant Director, OGD  
Central Intelligence Agency

ATTN :

SUBJECT: Psychological Warfare Intelligence Estimate

Reference is made to your memorandum of March 19, 1951.

We are forwarding directly to the Joint Intelligence Group six copies of OIR Report C.S. 5.5, "Estimate of Psychological Warfare Vulnerabilities in Certain Countries" dated March 12, 1951.

Four copies of this publication are enclosed for your information.

Chief, CIA Liaison Branch,  
Acquisition and Distribution Division,  
Department of State

Enclosure:

As stated above.

CLB-2091

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# Estimate of Psychological Warfare Vulnerabilities in Certain Countries

OIR REPORT CS 5.5

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH

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ERRATA -- OIR Report No. CS 5.5 - Estimate of Psychological Warfare Vulnerabilities in Certain Countries

On page 24, insert the following:

2. Conclusion

While from the viewpoint of active resistance Hungarians are traditionally passive, they are by national characteristics pre-disposed to side with any adversary of the Soviet Union. In addition, they are traditionally pro-US. Beyond these basic facts the effectiveness of psychological warfare largely depends on convincing the Hungarians that postwar plans of the Western liberators are well devised, amount to more than high-sounding slogans and will be carried out with firmness.

On page 38, substitute the following for the tabulation of linguistic groups under the heading "b) Languages":

Mandarin	334,276,000
Wu	28,092,000
Cantonese	20,881,000
Amoy-Swatow	13,145,000
Foochow	10,817,000
Hakka	10,744,000
Anhuei	1,074,000

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ESTIMATE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE VULNERABILITIES  
IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES

I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to estimate vulnerabilities of certain countries to psychological warfare. The countries covered are the following; in Western Europe -- France, Austria, Germany; in Eastern Europe - USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia; in the Far East - China.

The estimates are based on the following assumptions:

- (a) The USSR has embarked upon open military operations and the United States has declared war.
- (b) The Soviet Army is occupying the country concerned, or the country is under the control of a Communist regime subservient to Moscow or pursuing a policy parallel to Soviet policy.
- (c) The United States is actively engaged not only in military operations but in psychological warfare operations intended to soften up the countries concerned for the purpose of ultimately liberating them from Communist rule.

For each of the countries certain factors relevant to psychological warfare operations are discussed. These include (a) traditional structure, orientation, and stability of the government; (b) a brief characterization of the population, stressing the main qualities of their national character, their linguistic and physical accessibility to psychological warfare, and an estimate of their national morale under the given assumptions; and (c) an estimate of the susceptibility of the country concerned to psychological warfare and vulnerability to subversion by the United States under the given assumptions.

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II. WESTERN EUROPE

A. France

1. Basic Factors

a. Government

(1) Traditional structure. France has had, uninterruptedly, a republican form of government of the parliamentary type since September 4, 1870, except for the short Vichy period in 1940-43 and the succeeding interim provisional governments which led up to the present Fourth Republic, established on January 16, 1947. Although two Empires and the Bourbon Restoration intervened between the First and Second Republics of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the pertinacity with which the population has turned to democratic government since the French Revolution fixes the traditional structure as that of a constitutional republic, based on democratically elected, parliamentary institutions.

(2) Traditional orientation. In internal politics, prewar as well as postwar government in France has been by coalition, as no single political party has enjoyed an absolute majority owing to the multiplicity of parties. During the 15 years immediately preceding World War II, the coalitions alternated in a fairly regular pattern. Moderate Left governments were succeeded by Center-Right cabinets until these were overthrown by the "Front Populaire" (a combination of Socialists and Radical-Socialists, with Communist cooperation outside the government), which, in turn, dwindled to Radical-Socialist governments without participation by other Leftist parties. Leftist orientation connoted social reforms such as full trade union rights, old age pensions, and the like--the breaking up of the power belonging to the great combines in industry and banks--through partial nationalization, as well as dissolution of the foreign-inspired Fascist Leagues and their paramilitary formations. Prior to World War II, Center and Right government domestic programs were associated with "orthodox" finance systems and were more negotiations of leftist programs than distinctive platforms in themselves.

Postwar French Governments have continued the tradition of coalitions. With the exception of the period from the end of 1945 to May 1947, when the Communists held--first genuinely, and then only nominally--important cabinet posts, the coalitions have represented "Third Force" combinations. By "Third Force" is meant groupings of the Left Center (Socialists and liberal Catholic Popular Republican Movement--MRP), Right Center (Radical-Socialists and the

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smaller Union Démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance), and Right parties (Independent Republicans, Peasant Party, Republican Liberty Party, etc.), with a few minor formations, which exclude both the Communists on the Extreme Left and the Gaullists on the Extreme Right. The internal political orientation of the "Third Force" has been increasingly anti-Communist and increasingly in favor of a strong national defense program. Its approach to social and economic problems represents a compromise between planned economy and social welfare programs advocated by Socialists and the MRP and the rightist platforms of few if any governmental controls, curtailed social security, and a balanced budget. Because the Left Center parties are outvoted in the cabinet and cannot ally themselves with the Communists in Parliament, the compromise is weighted on the side of conservatism, which has resulted in a sizeable defection in support of the government on the part of even the non-Communist working-classes.

French foreign policy from the latter part of the nineteenth century to the present has been one of "providing security" for the national territory, by a system of military alliances and peace treaties which varied according to the fluctuating balance of power in Europe. Since the coming into being of the League of Nations and the United Nations, such covenants have fallen within the framework of these international organizations. The era covered may be divided into two parts, the first dealing with the German bid for hegemony and the second with Soviet-Russian expansionism. Concern over German preponderance led France into the Franco-Russian Pact of 1896, the Entente Cordiale with England, and the Triple Entente (France, England, Russia). After World War I, the Locarno Treaties of 1925 between France, England, Germany, Italy, and Belgium sought to guarantee the French frontiers established by the Versailles Peace Treaty. The rise of Hitler, coupled with the Polish-German nonaggression pact and the decline of the League of Nations, spurred France to attempt an unsuccessful series of nonaggression pacts with the Eastern European powers of the Danubian Basin. In 1936 a military assistance treaty was signed with the Soviet Union. After the liberation of France interest in another Franco-Russian Pact revived, and the De Gaulle Provisional Government signed an agreement between the two countries in 1944. However, after the Moscow Conference in 1947, French hopes to mediate US-USSR differences waned. France is now solidly linked with the US and the Western European powers against the Soviet Union; under the Brussels Pact and North Atlantic Treaty, France is the pivotal nation of the US-inspired defense system for the European Continent.

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(3) Traditional stability. The stability of French governments cannot be measured solely in terms of the life span of cabinets. Under the parliamentary system of the Fourth Republic, the government is responsible to the National Assembly, whose refusal of a vote of confidence necessitates collective resignation. However, a successor government may include nearly all the members of the outgoing cabinet, while basic government policy remains virtually identical. Under the Third Republic, the average life of a coalition was about seven months. Although the "Third Force" has been continually in office since November 1947, seven varied groupings have governed during that period and there have been 10 French governments since the liberation.

b. The People

(1) Characteristics of the population. The French character is a blend of many essences and, like the climate of the country, is civilized in the sense that it is temperate. This fundamental moderation, however, does not denote passivity or servility vis-à-vis a national enemy. The average French man or woman is courageous to the point of temerity. Throughout World Wars I and II, the quality of endurance exhibited by the majority of the population showed that patient constancy, rather than the volatility superficially attributed to Latin races, is a cardinal French characteristic. The average Frenchman is ingenious, contriving much with very little. He is also individualistic, literate, and witty. Intellectually receptive to insurgent ideas, the French are socially conservative. The family as an institution is perhaps more inviolable in France, where there are relatively few divorces, than in the US. Ownership of property is a deep-seated instinct among all classes. Church influence is another active element in cementing a highly stratified society, although less than one third of the Catholic population are practicing Catholics.

Among the handicaps, from the viewpoint of psychological warfare, are the qualities of general skepticism and cynicism, as well as quarrelsomeness and lack of discipline, reflected in the fragmentation of political parties. However, these handicaps are more prevalent in peacetime than under enemy occupation, when they are largely offset by patriotism above political party and class quarrels. In addition, the French remain insular, having a feeling of superiority over most foreigners and, falsely imagining that they are universally admired for their unique contribution to Western culture, are resentful when they discover that foreigners admire themselves still more.

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Key aspirations are probably reduced to a longing for relief from war and time to recover from two devastating world conflicts, with a modicum of security and well-being. There are evidences that the general public views with repugnance the use of the atomic bomb. A 1950 survey found a substantial increase over 1949 in the percentage of persons who would have disapproved the use of the A-Bomb even against the Germans in 1940 to prevent the occupation of France. While the reaction is primarily due to fear that its use would extend the war to Europe, it also reflects a moral aversion to the use of this weapon.

(2) Accessibility to psychological warfare. The very high degree of literacy renders the population very accessible to any media of psychological warfare employing the written or spoken word. As to diversity and distribution of languages, numerically large colonies of non-French Europeans, Africans, and Asiatics are scattered throughout France, but with few exceptions they speak, read, and understand French. Only a small percentage of the French population, or foreigners on French soil, know English.

It is estimated that nearly half the total population of France could be reached by radio broadcasts. Declared receiver sets in December 1948 numbered 5,776,000, with another 1 to 1 1/2 million sets undeclared, bringing the total to about 7 million, with an average of slightly over three listeners per set. The most suitable media are broadcasts, leaflets, or pamphlets, in view of the population's rich vocabulary and taste for style. During World War II, the most effective propaganda instrument was the British BBC, rather than leaflets, pictures, or clandestinely printed news sheets.

(3) Nationale morale. National morale in France during the German invasions of 1870 and 1914-18 stood up under the severest tests. The swift collapse of the French Army in 1940, however, induced a state of shock which in the main prevented an active will to resist. Rallying thereafter, the greater part of the population waited for liberation, while two minorities were divided into collaborators with the Nazis, and active members of a resistance movement. In August 1944, Paris was liberated by Resistance fighters, with the enthusiastic cooperation of the Parisians. Nevertheless, morale still suffers from the hidden, psychological wounds of two wars. Under Soviet occupation, with the French Communist minority coming into power and a repetition of the barbarity suffered in 1940-44, morale would sink before .

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it rallied. A sizable number of the indigenous Communist would collaborate with the invader. It is possible, however, that under the impact of actual occupation, the Communist ranks would split. Any occupation of the homeland by force with imposed Communist domination would, in the last analysis, however, produce a Resistance movement, even if it were a more perilous venture than under the Nazis.

2. Conclusion. French susceptibility to psychological warfare, in the event of Soviet occupation, would be high. The degree of vulnerability to subversion by the US would vary in relation to the chances of quick liberation.

B. Austria

1. Basic Factors.

a. Government

(1) Traditional structure. The Austrian Republic was founded in 1918 and had a Socialist government for the first two years of its existence. The basic legislation enacted during this time put many cardinal points of the Socialist program into practice (old age insurance, socialized medicine, freely elected shop stewards, chambers of labor with advisory functions in the legislative process, etc.). After the Socialists lost the parliamentary plurality in 1920, they were in opposition until the party was driven underground by the totalitarian Dollfuss regime, which combined conservative, clerical, and outright fascist elements. Schuschnigg refused to appease the workers and thus failed to establish a common front against the Nazis, so that no resistance was offered when Hitler marched into Austria in March 1938.

(2) Traditional orientation. The Austrians have a very brief and shallow democratic heritage. With the exception of a small group of Socialist intellectuals, they found it easy to embrace totalitarianism. There was no real resistance movement against the Nazis; the many political leaders imprisoned by the Hitler regime were either adherents of the Austro-fascist regime, Socialists, or Communists, but not Austrian nationalists in the narrowest sense. The democratically elected Austrian parliament, which maintains strict party discipline, has few functions other than to legalize actions determined by the social pressure groups in the secrecy of the party caucus. Parliamentary debate in the Anglo-Saxon sense is almost unknown.

(3) Traditional stability. The life of the First Republic, which ended with the Anschluss, was politically turbulent. After the Second World War an outstandingly stable Austrian government emerged in which both major parties (Conservative People's Party and Socialist Party) participate. The government's stability

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is predicated to a large extent on Western, particularly American, economic and political support, but it also stems from the realization in the Austrian Socialist Party that more can be gained from cooperation than from opposition and obstructionism.

b. The People

(1) Characterization of the population. A distinct Austrian national consciousness was scarcely in evidence during the First Republic, when most Austrians felt, as some still do, that union with Germany offered the only possibility for economic and political survival. The absence of Austrian nationalism is explained by the fact that the polyglot Austro-Hungarian monarchy opposed all nationalist tendencies; dynastic interests always prevailed over purely Austrian matters. After the Second World War three factors combined to produce something approaching an Austrian national spirit -- the maturing of the postwar generation; the experience of the war and the collapse of Germany which led Austrians to repudiate the Anschluss, at least for the time being; and the presence of foreign occupation troops.

There is an unusually great antagonism between Austria's two largest social pressure groups, the farming population and industrial labor. This rivalry is further enhanced by the disdain with which the rural population regards Vienna, which contains almost one-third of Austria's total population and most of its proletariat. The famous Socialist experiment in Vienna, following World War I, ridiculed and criticized in the rest of the country, could be carried out only through the device of federating the republic and granting the capital self-rule as one of nine federated provinces. As a result of this development and of the present division into four zones of occupation provincial centrifugalism is rather strongly developed.

The Austrian people are good workers, many of them highly skilled, though they are inclined to take things easy and follow the lines of least resistance. Generally speaking, political courage and moral stamina are not their forte. They are proud of their cultural tradition, particularly in music, and always regarded themselves as the easternmost bulwark of Western civilization, a role they successfully defended against Turk and Magyar invaders. Their most recent achievement in psychoanalysis, social philosophy, and the theater, however, have not received their due in the country at large because they originated in Vienna, or were dismissed by the many anti-Semitic minded Austrians as "Jewish inventions."

With the exception of a small militarist group, most Austrians today abhor war. Their aspiration is to occupy a neutral position like Switzerland, but the anomalous position of Austria as a liberated country which the occupation powers refuse to

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evacuate has convinced them that Austria is but a pawn in big power diplomacy and has very little voice in determining its own future.

(2) Accessibility to psychological warfare. The Austrians are highly literate. The universal language is German. There is a small bilingual area in southeastern Carinthia where Slovene is also spoken. Radio sets are numerous: approximately one for every seven members of the population; telephones are less so. Radio broadcasts would be the most suitable means for psychological warfare operations. Leaflets, particularly when dropped over urban areas, would also reach large segments of the population. Rumors by word of mouth would be an excellent way of undermining enemy control over the country.

(3) National morale. National morale is generally not too high and certainly subject to fluctuations. The present strong resistance to Soviet encroachments is predicated upon the certainty of Western support. In the event of Soviet conquest, morale would be low; its final level would be conditioned by the standard of living and extent of freedom the Communist power would allow.

## 2. Conclusion

Although the Austrians formed no resistance movement against the Hitler regime, they might engage in subversion against a Communist regime because they are fundamentally opposed to Communism. (Austrians are excellent agents and informers.) For that reason the Austrians would be susceptible to psychological warfare. Resistance groups would probably go so far as to cause slow downs and even sporadic industrial unrest, but they could not be counted upon to attempt open defiance of the occupation power.

## C. Germany

### 1. Basic Factors

#### a. Government

(1) Traditional structure. Parliamentary tradition is not deeply rooted in Germany. Weak before 1918, it was built up during the Weimar Republic by German Socialists and Liberals, who were, however, not strong enough to stem the antidemocratic and authoritarian trends in the face of grave internal and external problems such as reparations, inflation, and world economic crisis. Democratic tradition was shallow in Germany because a number of historical factors prevented the emergence of a strong democratically minded middle class: among these factors were the subservience of Lutheran Protestantism to the Prussian state; the failure of the middle class revolution of 1848; unification as a consequence of military victories and Bismarck's diplomacy rather than through independent middle class action; the political abdication of the

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middle class in exchange for economic privileges; the industrialization of the country without a corresponding extension of democratic institutions.

The result of these developments was a rather deep cleavage between aristocratic, military, and industrial elements on the one hand and the liberal stratum of the middle class and organized labor on the other. (Germany had the largest labor movement in Europe.) This cleavage was reflected and widened by the political parties, which accentuated the conflicts of the rival groups they represented by cloaking themselves with irreconcilable political philosophies.

Since 1945 Germany has had no central national government. The parliamentary system has been reintroduced in West Germany; in the Eastern Zone the Communists have maintained the forms of democratic government while introducing a totalitarian Communist regime.

(2) Traditional orientation and stability. In the period immediately following World War I (1918-20) the Socialist Party, which had established a moderate course by fighting its radical wing, dominated German politics. But the Socialists, even in coalition with the moderate middle class parties, were not strong enough to destroy the old antidemocratic forces, whose aim it was to smash the ascendancy of labor, tear up the Treaty of Versailles, and re-establish German hegemony over Europe. Consequently, they gradually lost out in their two-front struggle against the extreme left and right. The German governments between 1918 and 1933 reflected this development. Under the pressure of postwar problems and the world economic crisis stable government could not be established. The German bureaucracy and the armed forces showed little interest in supporting German democracy and tried to establish themselves as independent power factors thus contributing to the instability and eventual downfall of German democracy.

The traditional orientation in foreign policy has been an aggressive expansionism caused by Germany's belated participation in the world market and in the race for colonies. Germany's strong central position in Europe, and the rivalry between Great Britain and France enabled it to pursue a successful colonial policy. Its ambitious naval building program brought it into conflict with Great Britain. Between the two wars German policy was first aimed at eliminating the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. From the very beginning it tried to enlarge its scope of initiative and laid the groundwork of recuperating lost territories by playing the Western Powers against the Soviet Union. Under Hitler these objectives were enlarged to the concept of Lebensraum in Europe and realized by force.

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b. The People

(1) Characterization of the population. The Germans' outstanding characteristic, based on a strongly authoritarian family structure, is their obedience to established authority. From this trait stems their penchant for order and discipline, and also their thrift and industry rank among the leaders in all fields of human endeavor, but pride themselves particularly for their eminence in philosophy, poetry, and music and on their technological progress.

During the five decades of the German Empire the predominance of the landed nobility at court, in the army, in government, the judiciary, and the high civil service foiled the development of democratic ideas. The German middle classes, advancing toward a dominant economic position, owed their success not to a democratic revolution (as in France) but to the tutelage of absolutism. Frustration of German nationalism over a period of two centuries combined with the predisposition to submit to authority in inducing the German people to follow the aggressive, ruthless leadership of Hitler with his appeal to racial superiority.

By taking an unrealistic approach to domestic politics the Germans have wavered between political fanaticism and complete indifference toward politics. Their attitudes toward foreign peoples have equally vacillated between the extremes of feeling themselves superior to other nations and victimized by them. The people are now experiencing a period of apathy and war weariness, mixed with the fear that Germany may become the battleground between the East and West.

(2) Accessibility to psychological warfare. The indigenous population has a high literacy rate, but the influx of refugees since the war and the deterioration in educational facilities have lowered the literacy rate somewhat. Nevertheless, nearly all elements of the population would be accessible to the mass media employed in any intensive campaign of psychological warfare. Except for small Danish and Sorb (Lusatian) minorities and for displaced persons, German is the mother tongue of the population. There is a single literary language used throughout the country, but various regions have highly individualized dialects, both spoken and written. The postwar influx of refugees from Eastern Europe has tended, however, to break down the differences in dialect. The Occupation has furthered the general knowledge of foreign languages.

The country, particularly the Western part, possesses a relatively high degree of mechanization of communication media, distinctly below US standards but comparing well with Western Europe. In all of Germany there are 15 million radio sets, with about 1.5 million of these capable of shortwave reception.

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Radio has been the most successful medium for reaching the population. Dissemination of leaflets would be the next most effective medium, while distribution of pictures would probably be less successful for a literate population. Word of mouth would be useful in propagating rumors only under expert handling.

(3) National morale. National cohesion is rated high. With the exception of the hard core of Communist functionaries and the East German youth, the German people are anti-Communist; their experience with the Nazi dictatorship and their tendency to submit to authoritarian rule have not lessened their aversion to Communism. In the event of war, the present West German Government or more likely an enlarged "national unity" government, would be likely to join the Western Allies as a government-in-exile.

## 2. Conclusion

Except for the East German youth, with whom Communist indoctrination has worked well, the population is susceptible to Western ideas. The subversive activities now carried on in East Germany receive support from Berlin and West Germany. In case of war, this resistance would continue and similar groups would spring up in Western Germany if it were occupied by Soviet troops. The effectiveness of resistance would depend on the degree of outside contact and support available. However, it is unlikely that such activities would develop into open, partisan warfare against a Communist regime.

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III. EASTERN EUROPEA. USSR

The best testimony to the susceptibility of the Soviet population to psychological warfare in peace or war is the Kremlin's attempt to isolate its people from contact with the non-Communist world. Fearful of the consequences of a free exchange of ideas and information, Moscow maintains monopolistic control over all media of communication, dictates the principles to be applied in all spheres of activity, limits strictly the movement of its citizens in the outside world, and employs a vast repressive system to stamp out any deviation from the prescribed norms of thinking and behavior.

It is unlikely that all sections of the Soviet population would be equally amenable to foreign propaganda. The intelligentsia could be reached most easily by foreign propaganda, but the degree of their susceptibility is open to some question. Undoubtedly the intelligentsia feel more keenly than other classes the oppressive impact of political and thought control. This potential focus of disaffection is, however, to a considerable extent neutralized by the emoluments, special privileges, and prestige which the Soviet regime consciously bestows upon them. The national minorities and the Russian peasant masses and rank and file industrial workers, in that order, would probably prove most responsive to outside influences. The armed forces are in a special category. The peacetime armed forces, predominantly professional, are highly indoctrinated in Communist ideology. In wartime, on the other hand, they would consist predominantly of civilians and would reflect the attitudes of civilians. In war, the armed forces would be most receptive to subversive propaganda when in disorganized retreat. The degree of vulnerability of all groups would depend largely on the military picture and would be greatest, especially in the case of the national minorities, when an invading force was closest to their area of habitation and able to aid any subversive outbreaks.

1. Basic Factors

a. Government: type and stability. The characteristic of Russian governments which has made and makes their stability uncertain, particularly in times of crisis, has been the traditional policy of repressing the individual. The individual's welfare has been sacrificed to the interests of a small minority group, such as the landed nobility under the autocratic Tsars and the Party bosses under the Communist regime. This disregard for the individual explains the ease with which the Soviet people have fallen prey to the Bolshevik contention that all governments are repressive and by implication that complete individual freedom could not be achieved until the state and its apparatus disappear.

The repressive nature of traditional Russian government has been largely responsible for efforts to subvert it. In the last four centuries there have been repeated attempts by dissatisfied segments of the population to subvert and overthrow the government. The Tsarist regime was overthrown in 1917 owing

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to a combination of grievances resulting from the military reverses of World War I, the age-old hunger of the peasant for land, the repressive measures against the rising industrial proletariat, and the nationalist aspirations of the subjugated non-Russian minorities.

The Bolshevik regime which succeeded to power in November 1917 remained in a precarious position during its initial years. Only by making concessions to petty private enterprise was the new regime able to mollify the hostile peasants and gain the opportunity to consolidate its position. Threats to the stability of the Communist government continued to manifest themselves thereafter but on a less dangerous scale. The struggle for power within the Communist Party, which took place after Lenin's death in 1924 and did not subside until Stalin's acquisition of complete control after the purge trials of 1936-38, threatened the stability of the regime. Finally the mass defection which took place in the ranks of the Red Army during the initial phases of the German invasion, the unreliability exhibited by several national minorities during the war, and the resistance of Ukrainian and Lithuanian armed bands which took place as the Red Army moved westward and evidently continued as late as the summer of 1950 in the case of the Ukrainians, indicate that the Kremlin's hold over its people is not complete.

Prolonged conditioning to repression has made Soviet citizens both docile and apathetic when under strict Soviet control, but potentially explosive if restraint were removed. The actions and attitudes of Soviet citizens suddenly freed from the Kremlin's control are not wholly predictable. Such circumstances would pose peculiar problems in psychological warfare. The most serious disadvantage in attempting to exploit the Soviet people's discontent with the regime lies in the lack of any organized opposition.

b. The people. Characterization and accessibility to psychological warfare. While the Soviet population would undoubtedly be shocked by the outbreak of hostilities between the USSR and the US and other Western powers, both because of its admiration for and awe of Western technical achievements and the memory of the destructiveness of the last war, it would again submit to the deprivations and horror of war as long as the Communist regime remained in control.

The strongest single motivation which the Soviet leaders are likely to exploit heavily to foster the people's will to fight and in maintaining civilian morale is Russian patriotism and traditional pride in repulsing foreign invaders. Should the Kremlin's control be weakened, however, it can be expected that defection would take place, particularly in the armed forces and among minority nationalities. This would undoubtedly not occur until the Russian Armies had suffered severe military reverses. Whether atomic bombings alone would jolt the potentially disaffected elements to effective subversive action is questionable. Since the Soviet citizen is relatively unprepared for the effects of atomic bombing and probably believes that effective countermeasures will be taken, the actual experience may result in panic more serious than that engendered

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by the initial German successes in the past war. But inasmuch as Moscow and other populated centers probably would be atom bomb targets in order to cripple transport and communications facilities, skillful anti-Soviet propaganda would be necessary to counteract the people's reaction to the bombing of populated areas and to complete the demoralization of the Soviet population before the Soviet government could mobilize its means of repression and counteract the momentary loss of control. It is more likely, however, that even the demoralized population could be stirred to effective subversive action only when anti-Soviet forces invaded the USSR and Communist forces retreated into the Soviet hinterland.

Probably the only sure way of contacting Soviet masses under wartime conditions would be by means of leaflets dropped from the air. If carefully and properly presented, such leaflets would be very effective. It is very likely that all radio receivers would be confiscated by the government immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, as they were in the last war. Currently there is not more than 1 radio in working order for each 63 Soviet citizens and approximately 1 short-wave radio for each 72 persons. The ownership of radios by Soviet citizens is rigidly controlled by a countrywide system requiring annual registration and payment of fees and notification of the responsible authorities of any change in the status or location of the radio. Fear of government reprisal for listening to non-Soviet broadcasts is general since the communication of views expressed on such programs to others could fall within the framework of Article 58, paragraph 10, of the RSFSR Criminal Code, which deals with anti-Soviet or counterrevolutionary propaganda and agitation.

Since 81.2 percent of the population was literate in 1939 and this figure is claimed to be higher in the postwar period, probably only a very small percentage of the Soviet people cannot be reached through written material. Although over 200 languages are spoken in the USSR, only a small percentage of the Soviet population cannot read and understand Russian. The study of Russian is required in all schools in the USSR, and at least 80 percent of the Soviet population normally uses Russian or one of the closely related Slavic languages. The proportion of Russian-reading people is highest in the European portion of the USSR and diminishes toward the peripheries of the Asiatic parts.

## 2. Conclusions

Operationally, the most formidable obstacles and challenges to psychological warfare in a conflict with the Soviet Union are:

- 1) Russian patriotism
- 2) Attitudes fixed by over thirty years of ideological indoctrination
- 3) The lack of organized opposition to the regime.

An important counterbalance to these forces exists, however, in the national minorities would probably prove particularly receptive to foreign influences. The people in the Baltic States, the Western Ukraine, and Western Belorussia,

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totalling roughly 20 million persons, have been especially dissatisfied with conditions under the Soviet regime and might be induced to revolt. Some of the older Soviet minorities among the Turco-Tatar peoples might also rebel if they saw the possibility of immediate help from approaching anti-Soviet forces. The Russian peasantry and factory workers could probably not be aroused to revolt but possibly could be disheartened sufficiently to hinder the Soviet war effort by slowing their tempo of work. Finally it is likely that large masses of the Soviet Army could be induced to desert under conditions of disorganized retreat, as they were in the beginning of World War II.

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B. Poland1. Basic Factorsa. Government

(1) Traditional structure. The Polish state originated as a monarchy, which in modern times became known as a "republic" owing to the election of the king by the nobility. The nobles prevented the growth of a strong central government. From 1795 to 1918 Poland ceased to exist as a state, having been conquered and divided under the rule of Russia, Austria, and Prussia. Resurrected after World War I, it became a parliamentary republic headed by a president, with responsible cabinet government. An excess of parties and partisan politics contributed to a breakdown of parliamentary government in the middle 1920's, and from 1926 to 1939 a militarist clique of the intelligentsia, headed by Pilsudski, seized control. This dictatorship, however, was not strictly totalitarian, although it formally strengthened the executive and prevented free activity of the opposition parties. In sum, neither in its aristocratic nor in its democratic periods has Poland been accustomed to effective central government.

(2) Traditional orientation. A preponderant part of both the domestic and the foreign policy of Poland has been determined by its location between Germany and Russia. Traditionally the Poles have viewed themselves as standard-bearers of Western, Latin, Roman Catholic culture, with a colonizing mission eastward into Russia. Since the end of the Middle Ages they have likewise felt the compulsion to resist a similar eastward drive on the part of the Germans. Their defenselessness in modern times against a strong Germany and Russia has strengthened Poland's ties with France and (as in 1939) England. Political sympathies and large-scale emigration have similarly created bonds with the United States. Internally Poland has in modern times been a relatively poor peasant country, and its recent problems have revolved around the necessity of solving rural overpopulation through industrialization without adequate capital resources. The difficulty of accomplishing this task, given the backward political development of the people, while simultaneously maintaining large military defenses against the USSR and Germany, gave rise to the dictatorship in Poland between the world wars.

(3) Traditional stability. The only popular uprisings in Polish history have been against foreign rule (in 1794, 1830 and 1864 against the Russians, and in 1848 and 1944 against the Germans), and these were uniformly unsuccessful. In periods of independence the central government has frequently been unstable or erratic in the sense that it has been ineffectual owing to excessive particularism of the nobility, or, more recently, to exaggerated party divisions and rivalry.

b. The People

(1) Characteristics of the population. The Poles are highly individualistic and actively resent attempts, particularly by foreign rulers,

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to dominate or organize their internal affairs. Historically this is particularly true of the nobility and the middle classes and intelligentsia, who have been the principal bearers of nationalism. The peasant, while possessing a strong sense of private property and attachment to his land, has generally expressed his resistance to outside interference through evasion and cunning, rather than through overt rebellion, although in World War II the peasantry furnished strong contingents to the underground movement.

As a nation the Poles are spirited, often to the point of taking impractical action in matters that stir them deeply. At the same time, long periods of alien rule have accustomed them to adaptability and made them resourceful for survival. They have a traditional fear of the Germans, mingled with respect, and a fear of the Russians, mingled with contempt. If given a patriotic cause, they are first-class soldiers.

Currently the Poles appear to be in an apathetic phase, caused by exhaustion, pessimism regarding the possibility of resisting Soviet rule, and fear that the only alternative might be a return of German domination. While they have a latent hope of liberation through war, they hold a low estimate of the strength of their traditional allies, France and England. They still feel strong ties to the United States and regard it as potentially the strongest power in the world, but are dubious concerning US aims and determination.

(2) Accessibility to psychological warfare. As a nation the Poles are interested in and receptive to information from the West, as was proven by the highly organized reception and dissemination of Western radio broadcasts by the Polish underground during World War II, and by the widespread listening to the VOA, the BBC and the Madrid radio since the war. Radio reception is not so highly developed nor so widely distributed in Poland as it is in Czechoslovakia; nevertheless, Western broadcasts often receive wide word-of-mouth distribution. In a population of about 24 million, the total number of private receiving sets in use was officially stated to be 775,992 in March 1950, but the actual number, including unlicensed sets, is probably much larger. Most of these are equipped to receive medium and short-wave broadcasts. (One estimate gives 650,000 short-wave sets.) Nevertheless, the number of such sets probably does not amount to more than one for every 20 or 25 inhabitants, with the ratio being much smaller in the rural districts. In addition, there is considerable use of loudspeaker outlets for relaying programs, one estimate giving 370,000.

There is a rather high rate of illiteracy in Poland (15 - 20 percent), but the Communist regime appears to be making steady progress in lowering it. Newspapers are widely read, both in the urban and in the rural districts. Linguistically the country may be said to be homogeneous today (in contrast with its diversity on this score before World War II), as the entire population, including the numerically insignificant groups, understands and uses the Polish language.

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(3) National morale. The Poles have always shown high morale in their national cause, and often when their fortunes were lowest. It can be assumed that they would seize vigorously and resourcefully any genuine opportunity to resist the Soviet occupant and the Communist regime, particularly in a Soviet war against the US. Nevertheless, in view of their failure to win freedom through their efforts in World War II, it may be doubted whether they would put forth their best effort in a new war unless adequately assured of protection against Germany.

2. Conclusion

In case of war, the opportunity would be very favorable for encouraging a strong underground movement against the Soviet power in Poland, which would harass the regime by armed action. In the long run, however, the effectiveness of psychological warfare in Poland would be dependent upon the ability of the Western allies to inspire confidence in a fair postwar territorial and political settlement for Poland.

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C. Czechoslovakia1. Basic Factorsa. Government

(1) Traditional structure. Historically, the Czechs formed a monarchical state until early modern times, when they were subjugated by Austria. The Slovaks were subjects of the Hungarian monarchy from the tenth century until 1918. After World War I both peoples were united in a parliamentary republic that functioned between the world wars more successfully than any other of its type in Eastern Europe.

(2) Traditional orientation. Both Czechs and Slovaks participated fully in the rising nationalist movement of the nineteenth century, which culminated in their independence in 1918. Their joint participation in the postwar republic was complicated by Slovak resentment of Czech preponderance, a nationalist factor that still hinders the smooth functioning of the state.

Externally the Czechs have been primarily concerned with the danger of German and Austrian domination, while the Slovaks have been more keenly aware of the problem of asserting their independence against the Hungarians. During the period of the interwar republic (1918-38) Czechoslovakia maintained an alliance with Rumania and Yugoslavia against the danger of a Habsburg restoration and revisionism in Austria and Hungary. In the 1930's it strengthened its ties with France and the USSR against the rising threat of Hitler, although a strong party of Slovaks under Hlinka developed a fascist movement sympathetic to Nazi Germany. As a result of the Anglo-French abandonment of Czechoslovakia to Hitler in 1938, the Slovaks broke away and asserted separate national independence under German protection, while the Czech leaders, who were in exile, turned more and more to the USSR. The restored republic has consistently leaned on the USSR rather than on the West, even prior to the Communist seizure of power in 1948.

(3) Traditional stability. The republican government has maintained a high degree of stability. Only the special circumstances of Soviet policy and interference can account for the Communist coup d'etat of 1948. The presence of the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Zorin, the proximity of Soviet troops, and the belief of the anti-Communist leaders that the non-Soviet powers would not intervene to save them, led to capitulation to Communist demands.

b. People

(1) Characteristics of the population. There are considerable differences in character between the Czechs and the Slovaks that have to be taken into account in any calculation concerning

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psychological warfare. The Czechs are a more introverted people, and tend to exhibit the middle-class virtues, among which prudence stands high. In an emergency they are stolid and not given to unnecessary risks. Though highly individualistic, they are prone to bow to overwhelming force and to express their resentment through passive rather than active resistance. They are hard-working, with a strong ethical though not pietistic sense. They feel strong affinities to Western European libertarian ideas and practices. The Slovaks, on the other hand, are more volatile and extroverted, but also more conservative. They are prevaillingly a peasant people, in contrast to the industrialized Czechs. Strongly Roman Catholic, they have shown greater susceptibility to German authoritarianism and have been politically closer to the Germans and the Poles than the Czechs.

(2) Accessibility to psychological warfare. Both the Czechs and the Slovaks, particularly the former, are highly receptive to information from the West. Prior to the imposition of Communist censorship in 1948, they imported large quantities of Western literature and gave proportionately large coverage to Western news in an objective fashion. Listening to Western radio broadcasts was universal. Today access to the printed word from the West is for the most part cut off, but reception of Western broadcasts is still extensive. The number of radio receiving sets is proportionately one of the highest for any central or eastern European country. This is true for both rural and urban areas. The majority of both peasants and town-dwellers still can and do listen to Western broadcasts.

For a population of 12,400,000 there are 2,345,000 licensed receiving sets, including 46,000 crystal sets. There are a few additional unlicensed or "black" sets. The system of loudspeakers booked into relay stations is in use in Czechoslovakia as well as in the other satellite countries. There are 19 sets per 100 population, the highest in Eastern Europe. It is estimated that 1,840,000 radio sets are equipped for short-wave.

The Czechs are nearly 100 percent literate, but literacy is lower among the Slovaks. In Bohemia-Moravia the Czech language is used predominantly, while Slovak is used for the most part in Slovakia.

(3) National morale. Neither the Czechs nor the Slovaks have a tradition of spirited resistance under foreign domination or similar adversity. Acquiescence is the rule, particularly among the Czechs. Nevertheless, this attitude does not sink to the point of submitting to denationalization or surrender of ideas. It is often offset by a willingness to obstruct the oppressor in covert ways. Today the Czechs and Slovaks still feel close to the West and cherish hopes of liberation. It can be assumed that this hope would rise in case of hostilities, although it probably would not be accompanied by willingness to risk overt armed action.

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2. Conclusion

Both the Czechs and the Slovaks are psychologically very open to propaganda by the US, and in case of war could be counted on to follow US directions for harassing the Soviet occupant, so long as this did not involve overt armed action. It is doubtful that psychological warfare could spur them beyond the point of passive resistance and covert sabotage.

## D. Hungary

### 1. Basic Factors

#### a. Government

(1) Traditional structure. In theory the traditional structure of Hungarian government is monarchical, in practice, viceregal. There has been no Hungarian national king resident in the country since 1540; since that time the country has been governed either directly from abroad (Vienna) or indirectly through royal governors or viceroys, with two exceptions: in 1849, when for a few months Hungary was headed by an elected "governor-president," and for a quarter century between World Wars I and II, when limited royal powers were exercised by an elected "regent." The rule of the head of the state has, however, traditionally been limited by constitutional checks.

(2) Traditional orientation. The Hungarians, like many other Eastern European peoples, consider themselves the last eastern outpost of the West and an integral part of Western civilization. Except for the linguistic factor, which isolates them from all other European nationalities, this consideration has some basis in fact: religiously, Hungarian communities mark the easternmost extent of majority Roman Catholicism and of Protestantism in Europe; culturally, the eastern Hungarian ethnic frontier coincides with the dividing line between German-Latin and Slav-Byzantine cultures; politically, the organization of a centralized monarchy, limited by national assemblies, preceded the establishment of similar Western-type governments in Eastern Europe by about 800 years. Except for brief intervals in 1709-11 and 1848-49, when Hungary sought direct connections with the Atlantic community, Hungarian political and cultural orientation has been predominantly toward Germany for the past 400 years. The Atlantic orientation was renewed in 1945 with the collapse of the Reich; Hungarians, as distinct from their government, have attempted since then to fill the resulting vacuum with a combination of the Atlantic great powers, among which they look principally to the US for liberation. At no time since 1849 has a pro-Atlantic orientation had as many adherents in Hungary as it does today.

(3) Traditional stability. Once in power, Hungarian governments have traditionally been stable. No Hungarian regime has ever been overthrown by its internal opponents; revolutions have always occurred as a result of a fatal weakening or actual collapse of the governmental structure. Furthermore, revolutions thus far have always been followed by a restoration, whether governmental or social. From the international point of view, Hungarian regimes are, as a rule, functions of the power combination prevailing in Eastern Europe. Consequently, the stability of the present Hungarian regime is a function of the existence of the Soviet power center; a significant weakening or total destruction of the latter would be accompanied by a modification or disappearance of the present Hungarian Government.

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b. The People

(1) Characteristics of the population. Hungarians are a traditionally passive people; whenever active resistance has manifested itself on the political scene during the past century, it has always remained confined to a very small minority. Since they are non-Slav, non-Orthodox, and highly individualistic, they are predisposed by national characteristics to side with any adversary of the Slav, Orthodox, and socialistic Soviet power. Since the end of World War II this predisposition has increased because of the excesses of Soviet military occupation, superimposition of a non-representative Communist minority, Soviet economic exploitation, anti-Catholic persecution, and isolation from the West. Anti-Semitism though latent, is extremely strong, owing to the fact that some Hungarian Jews are playing leading roles in the Communist government. Anti-Semitic excesses are certain to follow if the fall of the present regime should not occur under moderating influence of the US or one of its principal allies. The Hungarian people are traditionally respectful of American democracy, high living standards, and industrial development. Current popular opinion portrays the US as the sole agent through which deliverance from Soviet subjugation can be effected. Although they probably dread the A-Bomb as much as any other people, the Hungarians believe that only through war will they be liberated.

(2) Accessibility to psychological warfare

a) Literacy. The general cultural level of the population is high. Latest available statistics show 90.4 percent of the population over six years of age as being able to read and write.

b) Languages. According to the census of 1941, minorities constitute only 4.2 percent of the population. These minorities are Slovaks, South-Slavs, and Rumanians. Even members of these groups, however, can speak Hungarian.

c) Types of communications. Hungary has an extensive and up-to-date telecommunications system. Apart from the usual facilities offered by the telephone and telegraph network, radio is the best medium. In 1950 there were an estimated 700,000 licensed receiving sets, including crystal sets, plus an estimated 5,000 unregistered, or "black," sets. Of these about 400,000 were estimated as equipped for short-wave. Of the 108,000 receiving sets scheduled for production in 1950, 57,000 were to be "people's radios," unsuitable for short-wave reception; 20,000 were to be so-called "super" sets and 13,000 so-called "high power" sets. With a total population of 9.25 million, there were about 8 sets per 100 of the population. In urban areas it is estimated that there are about four listeners per short-wave set; in rural areas the number of such listeners is much higher.

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d) Most suitable media. Having served as targets for radio propaganda incessantly for almost a decade, Hungarians are somewhat inured to, although not uninterested in, in radio. Leaflets dropped in great numbers by Allied planes would have an electrifying effect, far surpassing in intensity whatever results could be obtained by broadcasts. The most efficacious propaganda medium would be by word of mouth, if employed by an invading and advancing Allied army.

(3) National morale. A high, fighting morale does not exist in Hungary. A traditionally passive people, the Hungarians consider themselves as pawns in the East-West struggle and expect the West to liberate them. During the "liberation" of Hungary in 1944-45, the major part of the urban population cowered in the shelters or went into hiding, a considerable segment fled with the defeated German occupiers; an infinitesimal percentage engaged in partisan warfare and sabotage. There is no reason to assume that the population would react differently toward Western liberators, except that the initial enthusiasm would not be likely to turn into disillusionment, as was the case with the Soviet liberators.

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E. Rumania1. Basic Factorsa. Government

(1) Traditional structure. From its founding as a modern state in 1859 to 1947, when King Mihai I was forced to abdicate, Rumania had a monarchical government which on the whole guaranteed to its people certain constitutional rights and liberties. Pressure from the Axis powers induced King Carol II to proclaim a personal dictatorship in 1938, when the 1923 constitution was replaced by a new one which provided for the abolition of all political parties and the suspension of all constitutional freedoms. The constitution of 1923 was restored in 1944 but was finally abolished in December 1947, when the People's Republic of Rumania was proclaimed by the Communists.

(2) Traditional foreign and domestic orientation. The Rumanians have traditionally looked to the West in modern times for guidance and inspiration, both in their foreign relations and domestic developments. Considering themselves of Latin origin and speaking a Romance language, the Rumanians see themselves as the true representatives of the Roman civilization in the East. The modern Rumanian state worked assiduously to develop a system of government patterned after that of the countries of the West, whence it derived its royal family, and to educate its people in line with Western cultural and educational principles. Nevertheless, there is a historical tradition of native independence and autonomy not entirely obscured by the foreign domination and influences of modern times. Until September 1944, when the Soviet Army occupied the country, Rumania, a non-Slav country, had developed strong political ties with the West, particularly with France, while it had discouraged political and cultural influence from Tsarist as well as Soviet Russia. In fact, because of Russia's territorial acquisitions at Rumania's expense, Russia has traditionally been considered by the Rumanians as their natural and most hated enemy.

(3) Traditional stability. With a few minor exceptions, the governments of modern Rumania have been stable. The exceptions include a peasant revolt in 1907, a few labor strikes between 1920 and 1935, and a short but bloody revolt in Bucharest in 1941. On the other hand, Rumanian history contains a number of instances of native revolts against foreign rule.

b. The People

(1) Characterization of the population. Rumanian culture and the behavior of Rumanians at many critical times in the past have differed not only from those of Western Europe but also from those of bordering Slavic nations. These differences have been attributed to Rumania's Latin origin, or adoption, its centuries of domination by the Turks, the small degree of industrialization, and the impoverished

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condition of the peasantry. The Rumanian population has variously been described as orientally submissive and fatalistic and as quick-witted and alert; as incorrigibly gay and as sullen and treacherous. Surrounded completely by Slavic-speaking people and by Hungarians, the Rumanians see their history as a long struggle during which they have preserved their Roman tongue and their identity against their conquerors. Consequently, their nationalism was developed in an extreme form.

Composed largely of peasants, the Rumanians are provincial, religious, conservative, fairly tolerant except toward the important Jewish population, individualistic, and democratic. Whether Orthodox or Catholic, the Rumanian is a devout person for whom religion has tremendous moral and spiritual value; he loves it as he loves his land. On the other hand, prior to the advent of the Communists, there was an urban minority which was ultra-sophisticated, worldly, and cosmopolitan as well as nationalistic with respect to local minorities.

(2) Accessibility to psychological warfare. According to the Rumanian official census of January 1948, the Rumanian population was divided linguistically as follows: Rumanian 13,597,613 (85.7 percent); Hungarian 1,499,851 (9.4 percent); German 343,913 (2.2 percent); Yiddish 138,795 (0.9 percent); others (Turkish, Greek, Serbo-Croat, Russian, Albanian, Bulgarian, Armenian, etc.) 292,452 (1.8 Percent). The great majority of the minority groups also speak Rumanian.

There are in Rumania today some 270,000 privately owned radio receiving sets (not counting the number of unlicensed sets), most of which receive short-wave broadcasts. There are also several excellent radio stations in Rumania, the most powerful of which (150 kw) is located at Tancabesti. Other media of communication systems, such as the telephone system, are in good operational order.

Experience during and since World War II indicates that broadcasts from Western radio networks have been the best propaganda media. Word of mouth is also very effective. Propaganda leaflets, in both Rumanian and the principal minority languages, could also be used with good results.

(3) National morale. Basically an unwarlike people, the Rumanians have fought bravely only when it has been a question of national survival; once the fighting passes beyond their borders, there has been a noticeable decline of morale both in the armed forces and among the population. This was especially true during World War II. Marshal Ion Antonescu received enthusiastic support in his declaration of war against the USSR in June 1941; but once the Rumanian territories (Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina) which were seized by the Soviet Union in June 1940 were liberated there was a general popular demand for ending the war, and the morale of the armed forces weakened.

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Currently, the great majority of the Rumanians feel that their country has become a Russian colony. For this reason, they are hoping for an East-West conflict, for they see no other possibility of salvation. While the spirit of resistance of the former upper classes has been crushed, the majority of the peasantry and workers are still strongly anti-Communist and their morale is high. Although there is no large-scale, coordinated resistance group among labor, there is some unorganized passive resistance which is manifest in slow-downs, mishandling of machinery and goods, intentional accidents, etc.

Even the rank and file of the Rumanian Workers' Party (Communist) are said to be dissatisfied and basically anti-Communist. This feeling appears to extend even to the security police and some ministries. Only some 10 to 15 percent of the party members are said to be fanatic Stalinists.

## 2. Conclusions

Under present conditions the majority of the Rumanians have placed all hope of liberation in the West, particularly the US. However, the control exercised by the present regime, the presence of Soviet armed forces in Rumania, and the contiguity of the USSR to Rumania exclude any possibility of open anti-Communist revolt in that country. The Rumanians may be expected to become active only in the event of open hostilities, and even then only if Western forces are successful.

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~~SECRET~~F. Bulgaria1. Basic Factorsa. Government

(1) Traditional structure. Bulgaria, a country with a long historical tradition, was founded in modern times first as a principality and later a kingdom in 1878 following its liberation by Russia from the 500-year rule of the Ottoman Empire. Its three rulers, Alexander, Ferdinand and Boris, exercised considerable absolute powers, although there were parliamentary institutions in existence. Along with the other Central Powers, Bulgaria emerged in 1918 as a thoroughly demoralized and vanquished country. This political and moral defeat set the stage for the chaotic history of the interwar period which began with the abdication of Ferdinand in 1918 in favor of his son Boris, the rise and fall of a peasant dictatorship under the iron rule of Alexander Stamboliiski from 1918-23, succeeded by various coalitions, until the struggle grew so intense that the remnants of the parliamentary system were temporarily overthrown in 1934 by the Zveno Military League. The leaders of this coup d'etat were themselves soon ousted and Boris and a ministerial council ruled in authoritarian fashion with a rubber stamp parliament until the eve of World War II.

Bulgaria's Central European orientation was further accentuated when the country was forced to align itself with the Axis in 1940. For the following four years Bulgaria, although not an active belligerent, served as the key country in the German penetration of southeastern Europe. It refused, however, to declare war on the Soviet Union in spite of German insistence.

The appearance of the Red Army near the Bulgarian border in September 1944 coincided with the outbreak of a full-fledged national revolution. Bulgaria broke from Hitler's camp and declared war on Germany. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, declared war on Bulgaria. Bulgaria found itself in an unenviable position between the two blocs of World War II belligerents. Consequently, an opposition group, the Fatherland Front, with a democratic program, but including Communist elements, seized control of the country. The armistice of October 1944 confirmed Russian occupation. Energetic Soviet support, along with native political maneuvers and tactical moves, led to the complete control of the government by the Communist Party of Bulgaria, working at first behind the facade of the Fatherland Front. A People's Republic was established after a plebiscite which abolished the monarchy in September 1946. The steady stream of Russian propaganda, the close relations between Bulgarian Communist leaders and their Russian colleagues, a radical peasant movement, and the similarity of the racial background and language of the two peoples were factors which contributed to effective Communist influence during the war.

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(2) Traditional orientation. Bulgaria's foreign and domestic orientation has been conditioned principally by the following factors: (1) its strategic geographic location, (2) a strong and persistent Western influence, and (3) its close link with Russia based on tradition, race, language, and religion.

Essentially a Danubian nation, Bulgaria has direct access to the Black Sea and close geographic if not political ties to the Aegean Sea. It lies athwart the European land approach to Turkey and the Straits. It has a long border with northern Greece. The inclusion of a part of Macedonia in Greece has given Bulgaria an interest in the Greek civil war apart from Communist aspects. Bulgaria lays claim to Greek Thrace and an outlet on the Aegean which, if satisfied, would indirectly give the Soviet Union a long-desired base in the Mediterranean.

With respect to the US, Bulgaria's development in recent times has been strongly affected by a century of American missionary, philanthropic, and educational work among Bulgarians, which, unlike that of other countries, was private and nonpolitical. American contributions to Bulgarian national independence, and Bulgarian, including Macedonian, emigration to the US are additional considerations making for close ties. Traditionally, Bulgarians have looked to the US as an unselfish benefactor of small oppressed nations and as a haven from political or economic vicissitudes at home.

To the average Bulgarian neither Britain nor the United States had anything like the importance of Russia. One political tradition of great importance was established by the fact that Bulgaria was liberated from Turkish rule through Russia's intervention. This factor has greatly influenced the country's recent development and has accentuated a pro-Russian, Pan-Slavic national orientation. Racial affinity, language, and religion are other strong Russian influences. The bulk of the population has favored friendship both with the US and the USSR, but the conduct of the Red Army following the latter part of 1944, the Soviet colonial exploitation of Bulgaria, and above all the brutality of Bulgarian Communists and the ruthlessness of Sovietization have alienated most people from the USSR. Nevertheless the Communists are thoroughly in control in Bulgaria.

(3) Traditional stability. Bulgaria has been a stage for a conflict of interests far wider and stronger than any that could arise from its own internal problems or its own political influence. In periods of independence there was a constant tug-of-war between the forces of (1) old bourgeois "law and order" parties, (2) peasant parties, (3) Communist and Socialist parties, and (4) chauvinist-fascist parties, including the Macedonian group. Since Bulgaria's establishment, there have been several major political upsets.

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b. People

(1) Characteristics of population. The Bulgars in general are a sober, frugal, thrifty, industrious people. They are hardy and effective fighters and take great pride in their military prowess and achievements. About 90 percent of the people are peasants or have a peasant origin, and therefore share many of the characteristics of peasants everywhere. They are independent and opinionated; political parties split into numerable fractions, and the illiterate peasants are likely to have very definite ideas on how the country should be run. Discipline and authority have undisputed place in the family and in the village, but traditionally an element of anarchy has pervaded political life. The Bulgar's respect for authority is qualified by his individualism and the tradition of taking law into his own hands -- a tradition inherited from Turkish times. The peasants are difficult to organize politically.

(2) Accessibility to psychological warfare. In the last half century great progress has been made in education. Consequently, Bulgaria has a relatively high degree of literacy. In 1943 the literacy rate was 68.4 percent of the population. Linguistically the country is virtually homogeneous. The Cyrillic alphabet predominates. The Turks are the principal ethnic and religious minority.

Telecommunication, now in the hands of Communist officials, has traditionally been in the hands of the state. Every aspect of radio, including broadcasting, licensing, sale and manufacturing, resides in the state. Radio listening is still unrestricted and anyone, theoretically, may own a receiving set after obtaining a license and paying a fee. In practice, ownership is restricted to approved customers. With increasing police surveillance, listeners to anti-Communist foreign radio programs run considerable personal risk. About one-third of all receiver sets are in Sofia, one-sixth in other large towns, and one-half in villages. Of the 209,000 officially licensed radio sets, 168,000 are estimated to be equipped for short-wave listening. There are about three sets per 100 population.

Radio receiving facilities, the chief medium for the penetration of foreign propaganda, are fairly well developed, especially in urban localities. However, in villages and small localities a certain number of receivers are likely to be controlled by public or communal agencies. The loudspeaker relay system is also increasing. Because of the high literacy rate, printed material, pictographs, photos, and other types of "white" propaganda appear to be satisfactory media. Word-of-mouth dissemination naturally would be of great advantage, especially with the peasants who comprise more than 80 percent of the country's population.

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(3) National morale. Serious inroads are being made by Communism on youth in general, especially those who entered secondary schools after the revamping of the school system and the liquidation of the political opposition in 1946-47. Present supporters of the Communist regime include the majority of ordinary industrial and landless agricultural workers (proletariat), some students and intellectuals. Although the majority of the population under present circumstances might appear to collaborate actively or passively with the Communists, at most 15 to 20 percent support the regime, but this percentage will undoubtedly increase with time.

Elements hostile to the USSR, in addition to the peasants include prewar right-wing political parties proscribed after September 9, 1944, opposition parties formerly associated with the Fatherland Front, including Agrarians, Socialists, most of the former members of the Zveno Party; proscribed right-wing pro-German and royalist organizations, including the Bramniks, and Legionnaires, and followers of Tsyankov; and the Macedonians Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization in general, as well as the religious groups.

## 2. Conclusion

Bulgarians in recent years have been subjected to intensive propaganda from the Germans, the Allies, and the Communists. But the political awareness of the people and their historical position between competing outside forces has developed a sense of scepticism and caution. In addition, the active and outspoken anti-Communist political opposition parties and press which survived until 1947 have undoubtedly slowed up the effects of Communist propaganda. Consequently, well-planned US propaganda should prove effective as the majority of the adult population remains pro-American. As many nominal opportunist supporters of the Communist regime also probably retain Western and US sympathies, they would be susceptible to subversion. However, because of the effectiveness of Communist-Soviet control, and Bulgaria's recent unfortunate experiences, the Bulgarian people would have to feel assured of effective US support before acting.

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#### IV. YUGOSLAVIA

##### 1. Basic Factors

###### a. Government

(1) Traditional structure and orientation. Before the imposition of the Communist regime, Yugoslavia possessed, chiefly in its peasant masses, a fertile field for democracy. Even the smallest communes had their own government. The peasants were accustomed to meeting frequently to discuss their problems and to elect their leaders. These leaders had little power, but the experience in self government which the peasant acquired gave him a feeling for democracy. Mass emigration to the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century has had a great influence on Yugoslav life and it can be safely said that virtually all Yugoslavs (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins) are essentially pre-American. This situation still prevails despite attempts by the Tito government from 1945 until 1949 to discourage it and to villify everything American.

While all Yugoslavs have a basically similar origin, outside influences persisting through centuries have produced a regional diversity of culture and social behaviour. Tradition, for example, has a stronger hold in the poorer and less educated districts of the south, such as Macedonia and Montenegro, than in the more cosmopolitan Western areas of the north. In some parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro the patriarchal form of family organization still exists. In Slovenia and Croatia habits and culture have been more under the influence of Rome and Vienna. The Serbs, set apart by their Orthodox religion and script, historically have been more under the influence of Byzantium and Moscow and have been looked down upon by Croats and Slovenes.

Since Yugoslavia's creation on October 29, 1918, its governmental structure has been that of a monarchy. The Serbian Karageorge dynasty became the ruling house. The period between the end of World War I and the advent of the Communist Tito government falls into clearly defined periods:

1918-29. The period of the democratic experiment which failed. In this period the traditional enmity between Serbs and Croats reasserted itself.

1929-34. The period of dictatorship which began with the suspension of the constitution by King Alexander and ended with his assassination by Croat and Macedonian separatists.

1934-41. The period of camouflaged dictatorship under a Regency, which put Yugoslavia in the Axis camp and the war.

1941-45. The period of World War II in the course of which the Communist Party seized power.

Thus, although Yugoslavs have strong leanings toward democratic government, and Croatia and Slovenia have long agitated for a federalist state, the Yugoslavs for the last 20 years have had a dictatorial, centralized government.

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(2) Traditional stability. Few Balkan governments have had political stability, and Yugoslavia is no exception. Political instability has been characteristic of Yugoslav governments and of Serbia for a century preceding the establishment of Yugoslavia. Inherent in the question of Yugoslav stability is the persistent problem of federalism versus centralism. The Communist Party has made extravagant claims of having settled this problem, but there is evidence that it is far from solved.

The half century activity of the Internal Macedonia Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) on behalf of Macedonian independence has been responsible for a considerable portion of instability.

b. The People

(1) Characterization of the population. The most outstanding Yugoslav popular characteristics are stubbornness, sensitivity, fearlessness, stamina, and a marked penchant for erratic behavior. The Serb is the most sensitive, the proudest, and the most primitive. He is the most turbulent and the most often dedicated to direct action, which often leads him to little respect for legal forms. The Croat, on the other hand is less touchy, more disposed to passivity, and less inclined to change. He is conscious of his Western orientation and is sensitive about his South Slav affiliations. The Slovene is a serious, hard-working community-loving citizen more on the order of the Croat.

Internally Yugoslavia has its share of prejudices tied up with strong nationalism. The Moslems are disliked by both Serbs and Croats; Albanians are regarded with disdain by the Serbs and Hungarian and Rumanian elements in the Banat are distrusted; the centuries-old enmity between the Serbs and Croats persists.

Over 80 percent of the Yugoslav population is anti-Communist and pro-American. Many of these people, under the oppression of the Tito regime, honestly hope for World War III, for they are sure that in a war between the US and the USSR, US troops will free them from Communism, Stalinist or Titoist. It is doubtful whether the majority of them have any concept of the atomic bomb as an instrument of destruction.

(2) Accessibility to psychological warfare. In view of the high rate of illiteracy in Yugoslavia, the "big lie" technique as a propaganda weapon would have some success, especially if the material used were of a nature the majority of the people might be predisposed to believe. This technique played an important role in Communist propaganda during and after the war.

Communist propaganda has a great advantage over non-Communist propaganda in that Communist Party control of the mass media has restricted anti-Communist propaganda to broadcasts from outside the country.

Serbo-Croat, the language of Yugoslavia, is spoken by over 13 million of Yugoslavia's 16 million people. Slovene is spoken by another million and a half, although most Slovenes have little difficulty understanding Serbo-Croatian. The Communists have made great efforts to create a Macedonian language, even going so far as to print a Macedonian dictionary. Actually, Macedonian is

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is closely linked to Bulgarian and is spoken by slightly over one million people. Yugoslavia also has large numbers of minority groups, the Albanians being the most numerous. Albanian is spoken by nearly 700,000 people in Yugoslavia. The next most numerous minority groups are the Hungarians, the Germans, the Italians, and the Rumanians. Scattered and small settlements of Slovaks, Ruthenians and white Russians are also to be found but the white Russians have almost completely disappeared from Yugoslavia in the last year.

Manufacture, distribution, and licensing of radios is a government monopoly. Receiving sets must be registered. It is official policy to prevent persons suspected of disaffection from acquiring radios. This fact, plus the actual shortage of radios, limits their possession largely to those who support the regime. Emphasis is laid on communal radio installation for the purposes of propaganda control. The total number of receivers of all kinds is estimated at 290,000, with approximately 195,000 of these individually owned. An estimated 10,000 to 12,000 are illegal but these will gradually diminish in number because of the actions of the police and shortages of replacement parts. About 90 percent of all radios are equipped for limited short-wave reception.

Little is known of the present state of telecommunications in Yugoslavia. Many postal telegraph & telephone installations, and radio stations were wrecked during the war, and little is known of the accuracy of Communist claims that they have improved their telecommunications. It is, however, certain that the Communists have enlarged the radio network. Radio stations are known to be located in Belgrade, Zagreb, Capodistrija, Skoplje, Titograd, Ljubljana, Sarajevo, and Novi Sad.

The most suitable propaganda media for Yugoslavia in the order listed appear to be (1) radio broadcasts, (2) leaflets, (3) and word-of-mouth. To fully exploit radio broadcasts, it would be necessary, however, under the assumptions of this paper to make available a much larger supply of radios.

The national morale of the Yugoslavs under the assumed conditions would probably be very strong. Yugoslavs historically are familiar with foreign occupations. While there would be some collaborators, the bulk of the people would remain anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, and pro-Western. Morale would probably be highest in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sandzak, Montenegro, and Serbia, where greater possibilities for organized resistance to an invader exist. Morale would be lowest in the Vojvodina and other areas where the local terrain would not afford an opportunity for resistance to the occupier. If the US were successful in the early stages of the occupation in showing its clear-cut intention to aid resistance groups to fight the occupier, Yugoslav faith in eventual deliverance would undoubtedly be high.

Susceptibility of the Yugoslavs to psychological warfare and vulnerability to subversive activity by the US in case of war with the USSR would be considerable. The greatest danger would lie in the possibility that in arousing elements of the population to action against the occupier political and psychological forces might be unloaded which would be difficult to control in the postwar period. Yugoslavia appears to be particularly vulnerable to subversive activity and other forms of psychological warfare because of:

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- (1) its minorities and sectional tendencies.
- (2) geographical accessibility to the West.
- (3) its large mountainous area which lends itself to such activities as the dropping of sabotage groups, hideouts to resistance groups, protection for clandestine radios, etc.
- (4) the predominance of pro-American sentiment in the country as a whole.
- (5) the capacity and tradition of the South Slav for resistance to the occupier.
- (6) the large number of Yugoslavs in exile who could lend themselves to such activities.

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## V. CHINA

### 1. Basic Factors

a. Government. The imperial system of government in China broke down more than a century ago. The present Communist regime represents only the most recent of a series of governments that have tried to unify the country and to restore China to a high position in the family of nations. Government in China was traditionally an authoritarian structure, pyramidal in form, with the lines of authority clear and strong at the top, but becoming gradually more diffuse and weak in descending. Its outlook toward its own people was paternalistic, with both power and virtue expected to radiate from the top downwards. The attitude of the government towards foreign states was based on a conviction of the inherent superiority of Chinese culture. The operations of the government rested on the functioning of an elaborate bureaucracy, which generally helped to provide continuity and stability in times of change but which was affected by the strong pull of regionalism and provincialism. Officialdom has also tended to retain family interests that often conflicted with the efficient performance of its duties, a situation that nevertheless has been socially sanctioned.

Government has been limited historically both in its scope of activities and its range of effective control. Effective control by a central government in the past has usually penetrated only to the hsien ("county") level; below this level, control has been exercised by informal community rather than formal governmental machinery. There has been little direct central government interference in the life of the average Chinese. With little or no participation in the formal functions of government, and with almost no effective machinery for expressions of popular opinion, most Chinese have shown little interest in political issues outside their immediate ken.

The Communists have gone to considerable lengths to extend their formal governmental apparatus below the hsien level. They have also attempted to tighten the direct control of the government over the people by means of a multitude of so-called "people's organizations." At the same time, through control of communications media and censorship, the Communists have attempted to prevent the penetration of unauthorized information from the outside.

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b. The People

(1) Characterization of the population. In spite of the fundamental economic and political changes of the past century, traditional patterns of life and thought persist. The dominant element in Chinese society is the rural population, constituting about 80 to 90 percent of the total population. These people know and care little about the world outside. Despite their small size numerically, social leadership has tended to gravitate toward the urban middle-class and proletarian elements who represent the reservoir of literacy, technical skills, and administrative competency essential to the modernization of the country. Compared to the rural populace, the urban groups are politically more vocal, more aware of social and economic problems, and more desirous of a strong, independent China. They are also more sensitive to foreign encroachments.

Some of the characteristic attitudes of Chinese society might be summarized as:

a) A suspicion and dislike of foreigners. The Japanese are particularly disliked, while Americans in the past have incurred the least suspicion. Attitudes toward the Soviet Union are mixed; in the impersonal sphere of politics and principle, feelings are divided between interest and admiration and distrust and resentment, but in terms of personal relations between individuals, considerable antipathy has often been observed.

b) A deep-rooted cultural pride which often takes the form of a feeling of superiority. Western culture is regarded as basically materialistic, inferior, and more worthy of exploitation than adoption.

c) An eruptive feeling of nationalism, growing in part out of the above attitudes. The urban groups, being more articulate and more exposed to the West, are more chauvinistic and exhibit an extreme sensitivity towards real or imagined slights.

d) A general suspicion or even dread of the new, which includes a tendency to regard many scientific innovations as repugnant.

e) A reliance on direct personal relations, stemming from the preponderant role the family and village communities play in the individual's life.

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The mass of Chinese, particularly the farmers, have in the past shown a generally passive attitude toward war, which to them usually meant an affliction and in which they felt no personal identity. Widespread popular enthusiasm for war could be aroused and maintained only under very exceptional circumstances. Soldiers have traditionally been held in low esteem, but there are some indications that this prejudice may be breaking down. The great majority of Chinese know practically nothing about the atomic bomb, which the Chinese Communists describe as an ineffective weapon.

(2) Accessibility to psychological warfare

a) Literacy. There is no sound statistical basis for estimating the literacy level in China. A rough estimate would be that perhaps 35 percent of the men and 7 percent of the women are literate at a low level, while a much smaller fraction is literate in the sense of being able to read and understand an unsimplified newspaper. The number of those literate at a low level may rise somewhat in the near future, in view of the attention being given by the Chinese Communists to a large-scale program of adult instruction in basic reading.

b) Languages. The exchange of information in China has been hampered by the diversity of dialects spoken. However, as the table below indicates, about 75 percent of the total population speaks a form of Mandarin dialect, which is regarded as the "standard" national tongue and which is understood by most educated persons in China. Mandarin-speaking Chinese are concentrated in the northern and central-western portions of China, whereas the greatest diversity of languages and dialects occurs in the central and southeastern portions.

Estimated 1945 total population: 448, 191, 000

Estimated no. of those speaking:

Mandarin	334, 276, 000
Wu	28, 092, 000
Cantonese	20, 881, 000
Foochow	16, 877, 000
Hakka	10, 744, 000
Amoy-Swatow	7, 585, 000
Anhuei	1, 074, 000

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The above Chinese dialects are spoken by over 90 percent of the population. Somewhat less than 10 percent of the population speak non-Chinese languages or variants, such as Miao, Yao, Thai, Tibetan, Mongolian, Tungusic, Turkic, Korean, etc. Those speaking non-Chinese languages are generally in the peripheral areas of China.

c) Types of media. The number of radios in China is extremely small in proportion to the population, and distribution is uneven. An estimate by the Chinese Communists in April 1950 placed the total number of radio receiving sets at between 1 and 1.1 million. It was estimated that about half of these are Japanese-made medium-wave sets, and it is believed that only about 20,000 are short-wave sets. The northeast and East China regions each have about 350,000 to 400,000 sets, the North China region about 200,000, and other regions a total of about 100,000, according to the Communist estimate. Most of the sets are concentrated in the larger urban areas, particularly in cities along the coast. The Communists have organized an extensive and relatively effective system of internal radio monitoring throughout the country, whereby government regulations, party directives and propaganda messages are broadcast to a large corps of specially-trained listeners, who are charged with disseminating the material. Moreover, loud-speakers placed in central locations are used to reach a larger audience. All broadcasting facilities, like all forms of public communication, are strictly controlled by and serve the interests of the Communist regime.

The telephone and telegraph system in China is limited generally to the urban areas and along main lines of transportation.

d) Most suitable media. The modern mass media of public information have not yet begun to reach the great body of the Chinese public, in view of widespread illiteracy, limitations of press, radio and movies, and isolation of many areas. Printed material and broadcasts are essential for reaching the numerically small but influential urban groups in China. For the majority of the population however the most suitable media would be those involving the use of few printed words. Recognizing this fact, the Chinese Communists have made effective use of dramatic groups, story-tellers, posters, cartoons and photographs to carry their propaganda. Implicit in the use of these media is a recognition of the Chinese propensity to circulate information by word-of-mouth. Such transmission, the so-called "bamboo telegraph", while

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impossible to measure, is nevertheless often a rapid and effective means of spreading news and stories.

### (3) National Morale

Westerners have often been struck by the capacity of the Chinese to maintain good spirits under the most adverse circumstances. Hardship, poverty, and inequity are to most Chinese so familiar that they seem natural, and industry and thrift not virtues but necessities for survival. The Chinese have lived with violence and war for many years. Their morale, therefore, must be judged in these terms. Submission to the miseries of war and oppression will encompass a much wider range than in the West, but limits do exist, as the historical record of open rebellion against tyrannical government attests. The resilient national morale is affected by such factors as hope for continued survival, the dependence on a sense of personal and national dignity, an insistence on propriety and proper regard for "face", and a strong belief in the merits of an honorable compromise. The Chinese are realists, and their morale will sink if any regime continues a war in the face of a popular conviction that defeat could be avoided only by clever compromise.

### 2. Conclusion

The Chinese audience presents the most serious obstacles to the foreign propagandist. Three major impediments are the limited mass media facilities, the low level of literacy, and the domination of existing facilities by the Communist regime. On the hopeful side, the number of full-fledged Communists and active sympathizers in China is a small percentage of the total population, while there are many persons who will be inclined toward disaffection in time of difficulty. Increasing failures by the Communists to fulfill their promises, increasing oppression and hardship, may make the population more vulnerable to subversion than at present.

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